08 Sep A Look Back at the Taliban’s Victory: Impact on African Jihadist Strategies and Regional Dynamics

By Cara Rau

The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 sent shockwaves across the world, sparking a range of reactions from jihadist groups in Africa. For many of these groups, the Taliban’s success represented a long-awaited victory for Islamist militancy, with the triumph seen as a validation of jihadist ideology over a major Western military power. This perceived moral victory gave African jihadist groups hope that they, too, could achieve their objective of creating a state under strict Sharia law.

Al-Shabaab and the Taliban: The Al-Qaeda Connection

Al-Shabaab’s reaction to the takeover highlighted its strategic alignment with al-Qaeda. After the Taliban’s victory, Al-Shabaab framed its own struggle in a more positive light, using the Taliban’s example to reinforce its narrative, ideology, and strategic objectives in the Horn of Africa. The group’s leadership showed solidarity with the Taliban, celebrating their victory as a major achievement for the global jihadist movement.

Al-Shabaab’s affiliation with al-Qaeda provides significant prestige and recognition within the global jihadist network. This relationship helps the group forge connections with other affiliates, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, with which it has long-standing ties. This affiliation also has practical benefits, aiding in the recruitment of non-Somali foreign fighters from neighboring countries like Kenya and Ethiopia.

Positioning itself as al-Qaeda’s regional representative in East Africa, Al-Shabaab draws foreign fighters who are eager to join a prominent jihadist group in a strategically important conflict zone. For these recruits, Somalia offers an opportunity to gain experience in a high-profile struggle against Western influence and local governments, much like joining the Taliban from foreign theatres.”

“A Sahelian Strategy”

Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel viewed the Taliban’s takeover as validation of their strategies and proof that perseverance could lead to victory. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) issued a joint statement congratulating the Taliban, emphasizing that the victory in Afghanistan proved that waging jihad was justified.

JNIM’s military and communication strategies, modeled on al-Qaeda’s playbook, are working in the Sahel. The group has captured territory in Mali and Burkina Faso and continues to expand southward into Benin and Togo while carrying out frequent attacks in Niger. JNIM’s media wing, Az-Zallaqa Media, often releases training videos that bear a striking resemblance to those of AQAP, highlighting the close coordination between these groups.

Potential for Increased Cooperation with African Jihadist Groups

The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 likely encouraged greater cooperation and coordination between al-Qaeda factions in Africa, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda Central. This cooperation may involve sharing resources, expertise, and strategies, with a focus on expelling state entities from territory, as the Taliban did in Afghanistan. This close interaction between al-Qaeda-affiliated groups has probably contributed to the formation of a loosely connected network of militant organizations with shared objectives, tactics, and strategies. Such coordination could amplify the operational capabilities of African jihadist groups as they seek to emulate the Taliban’s success.

African Implications

The Taliban’s takeover demonstrated that Islamist militant groups could achieve significant military and strategic victories even when facing formidable international opposition, like the United States. African jihadist groups, both al-Qaeda- and Islamic State-aligned, likely experienced a renewed sense of purpose after witnessing the Taliban’s achievement. The victory highlighted that success was possible even in the face of regional military coalitions backed by Western forces, boosting the morale of these African groups.

The prospect of eventual victory became particularly relevant for jihadist groups in Africa, operating in conflict zones where they have established strongholds despite opposition from national and regional armed forces. The Taliban’s experience suggested that persistent insurgency could lead to substantial geopolitical victories if the conditions were similar to those in Afghanistan.

Impact on Internal African Jihadist Group Dynamics

The Taliban’s victory underscored the importance of understanding local contexts and regional dynamics in jihadist struggles. What worked in Afghanistan would not necessarily work in places like Nigeria, Mozambique, Somalia, or Burkina Faso due to significant historical, cultural, political, and religious differences. African jihadist groups, while inspired by the Taliban, still have to navigate their own unique political, social, and cultural landscapes.

It is also important to note that, even though the Islamic State publicly denounced the Taliban’s takeover, this does not mean they wouldn’t look to adopt some of the tactics that led to the Taliban’s success.

Furthermore, African jihadist groups have likely taken note of the challenges the Taliban has faced since taking power. The military strength that secured their victory in Afghanistan has not necessarily translated into success on the global political stage. The Taliban’s struggles with international recognition and legitimacy may serve as a cautionary tale for African jihadist groups that share the same long-term goals.

Conclusion

The reactions of African jihadist groups to the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan were characterized by a blend of admiration and strategic calculation. While the Taliban’s victory served as an inspirational milestone for many jihadists, it also likely prompted a re-evaluation of tactics, alliances, and governance strategies relevant to the local contexts where these groups operate.

The broader implications of the Taliban’s success extend beyond symbolism, influencing how jihadist groups in Africa approach their own struggles. As these groups continue to navigate their complex and evolving environments, the lessons from Afghanistan will likely remain a significant factor in shaping their future strategies and objectives.

The opinions presented in this article are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views or positions of ASI.

About the Author

Cara Rau is a research intern and international security analyst at ASI. She holds a Master’s Degree in Terrorism and Security Studies. She specializes in Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), focusing on Jihadism in the Sahel, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).